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Abstract
In complex systems like financial market, risk tolerance of individuals is crucial for system
resilience.The single-security price limit, designed as risk tolerance to protect investors by
avoiding sharp price fluctuation, is blamed for feeding market panic in times of crash.The
relationship between the critical market confidence which stabilizes the whole system and the
price limit is therefore an important aspect of system resilience. Using a simplified dynamic
model on networks of investors and stocks, an unexpected linear association between price
limit and critical market confidence is theoretically derived and empirically verified in this
paper. Our results highlight the importance of relatively ‘small’ but critical stocks that
drive the system to collapse by passing the failure from periphery to core. These small
stocks, largely originating from homogeneous investment strategies across the market, has
unintentionally suppressed system resilience with the exclusive increment of individual risk
tolerance. Imposing random investment requirements to mitigate herding behavior can thus
improve the market resilience.
Keywords: network science, financial system, risk contagion, market resilience, market
crash
Financial markets are characterized by complex systems which give rise to emergent
phenomena such as bubbles and crashes occasionally (Stavroglou et al., 2019). The price
limit for single-security, which usually regards as part of a broader effort to mitigate extreme
risk in stock market, has been widely used in China, the US, Japan and Canada, etc. It
forbids traders trading stocks at any price above or below a predefined level for the remainder
of the day. In Chinese A-share market, for instance, the absolute return permitted is 10%
for every regular stock. Though the single-security price limit is designed to be equal for all
securities, it functions as a stock-specified tolerance, and helps protect investors by avoiding
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sharp price declining or jumping. Conversely, price limit critics claim that price limit may be
ineffective (Bildik and Gu¨lay, 2006; Kim and Rhee, 1997) or even feed panic selling in times
of market crash (Shen and Goh, 2015). As the traders are in fear of the potential illiquidity
when price limit locks their positions (Bildik and Gu¨lay, 2006), they will collectively sell
stocks to seek for liquidity or reduce risk exposure, which in turn smashes market confidence
and leads to further downward depression on a wider range of stock prices. For instance,
in the 2015-2016 stock market crash in China, such global sell-off has spread so widely that
more than 1,000 stocks prices declining to the daily price limit has become nearly normal
for investors. From the complex system perspective, if the market confidence is enough to
withstand illiquidity shocks caused by the price limits, a system collapse can be avoided.
How the critical market confidence that keeps the market away from collapse reacts to price
limits therefore determines the market resilience, which usually described as the ability of a
system to adjust its activities to retain stable when shocks arrive (Gao et al., 2016). In the
context, a clear feature of interest is the presence of single-stock price limits’ effects on the
critical market confidence and system disruption.
An important depression contagion channel for price limits and market panic is the
overlapping portfolios when investors invest in the same equities. As mentioned above, this
might be the case if investors sought to hedge their exposure to potential illiquidity of the
security that had reached the price limit by trading other stocks in their portfolios. A similar
effect might arise if traders who have incurred mark-to-market losses in stocks of price limits
face margin calls or are required to reduce their positions to meet the obligation of leverage
ratio (Anderson et al., 2015; Bardoscia et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2018). Additionally, investors
may be unwilling to hold securities in fear of that the price limit is driven by information
that will affect the value of a wide range of stocks, e.g. the systemic risk (Brugler et al.,
2018). This kind of ‘loss of market confidence’, in particular, plays a non-negligible role in
market crisis (May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Arinaminpathy et al., 2012). Thus, it is worth
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exploring the exact knowledge of the relationship between the designed price limit that cause
liquidity shocks and the more general ‘loss of confidence’ that can provoke throughout the
system. It is also of great importance to probe how the investment behavior and market
network structure link together as well as how they influence the association between price
limit and critical market confidence, from both theoretical and practical perspectives.
We explore these by constructing a bipartite stock network. While previous work heavily
depends on numerical simulations of networks that are often assumed to be random (Ari-
naminpathy et al., 2012; May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Caccioli et al., 2015, 2014), we
use the bipartite network constructed by mutual fund share holding data in the real world.
We also introduce a contagion mechanism and its analytical explanation on the network for
capturing how the market confidence and price limits may contribute to market collapse in
times of crisis.
From the theoretical point of view, our approach recognizes some important differences
with other complex systems and inherently challenges existing understandings. While pre-
vious models have underlined the importance of ‘superspreader’ in ecosystem stability (Ari-
naminpathy et al., 2012; Haldane and May, 2011), our results adversely demonstrate the
importance of relatively ‘small’, totally ‘nested’ stocks that drives the system to collapse.
Those small stocks, largely originating from homogeneous risk-minimizing investment strat-
egy across the market, determine how the critical market confidence reacts to the price
limit. In practice, these findings inject new insights into the market supervision and suggest
authorities watch the critical small stocks instead of fully attracted by some systemically
important ones.
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Results
Model Overview
Here we build a bipartite stock-investor network (see Fig. 1). While similar networks
have been used to study the financial system stability (Huang et al., 2013; Delpini et al.,
2019; Poledna et al., 2018), the present paper would mainly focus on the stock market crash
and how the network structure determines the association between downward price limit
and critical market confidence, which features the market resilience.
The degree of S2 is 3;
The largest neighbor of S2 is C3 ;
The degree of C3 is 5.
Branching of S2 is 5/3.
S1 has one neighbor, i.e., C2;
The neighbors of S2 includes C2; 
The nestedness of S1 on S2 is 1.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Nestedness measures the intensity for S1 to get 
infected from S2 and to drive further contagion.
(d)
Branching measures the extent of exposure to 
infection and the extent to which S2 would 
broadcast depression. 
Figure 1: The stock-investor network illustration. (a) shows the network compositions, where the
grey squares are investors and the red circles are stocks. Edges exist only from one kind of nodes to the
other and edge weights represent how much the investors invest on the corresponding stocks with respect to
market values. It is an undirected weighted network. (b) shows the contagion procedure. The initial shock
is stock S1 reaching its price limit and losing c proportions of its market value. The lack of liquidity results
from this leads to investor C2 faces a proportion of share holdings being locked. This further makes C2 sell
other stocks in hand at τ = 1, i.e., S2, which then conveys the depression to C1, and so on and forth. (c)
and (d) shows the examples of ‘nestedness’ and ‘branching’ that defined in Methods.
Define the absolute value of price limit down as c, where c ∈ (0, 1). The market value of
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stock i at time τ is Si,τ . For stock i, if
Si,τ − Si,τ=0
Si,τ=0
≤ −c, (1)
stock i reaches its limit down price, what we called it ‘failed’. A high absolute value of
limit down allows a stock to withstand larger shocks before it is pushed to suffer the lack
of liquidity. We study the consequences of shock initially hitting any single stock at τ = 0,
with the shock taking the form of wiping out a fraction c of its initial values. While c is the
limit down threshold, this equals to evoking the stock’s failure. An initial failure of a stock
that reduces the market values of the investors’ liquidation ability will elicit the panic selling
on other stocks. If the market’s demand is less than perfectly elastic, such disposals will
result in a short run change in stock price (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Coval and Stafford, 2007).
Subsequently, the externally imposed price limits may dictate additional panic selling which
will have a further impact on market prices. See Fig. 1(b) for an illustration.
Following the outlined cascading procedure, we integrate the interaction of market confi-
dence into the model as a scaling effect on the liquidity shock. Specifically, the τ = 0 failure
by a single stock results in each of its investors’ holding portfolio experiencing a τ = 1 shock
of magnitude
α
Am,τ
Am,τ−1
, (2)
where α is the market confidence, α ∈ [0, 1], and Am,τ is the total stocks’ market value held
by investor m at time τ . The term Am,τ=1
Am,τ=0
defines the degree of illiquidity results from the
price limits of failed stocks, by which we assume that a depreciating investor may depress
the prices of other stocks in holding portfolio according to the relative illiquidity. The
market confidence α adjusts the illiquidity magnitude by multiplying Am,τ=1
Am,τ=0
and regulates
the market resilience accordingly. Market illiquidity is linked directly to confidence effects
by Eq.(2). The assumption is that investors who hold the failed stocks could dispose other
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stocks in their portfolios at lower prices that related to both their liquidity pressure and
market confidence. This process causes the capital position of other investors holding these
same stocks to be eroded.
We will now have further, τ = 1, failures of the stocks connected to the initially in-
fected investors if Eq.(1) is realized. This, in turn, may generate τ = 2 failures of stocks
when these τ = 1 failures of stocks convey the price downward pressure to their investors
through Eq.(2). And so on for τ = 3 and further. Arguably, the deficiency in the outlined
model is that we assume the confidence level remain fixed to be α as the cascade surges
through the system. Nevertheless, we believe that it is useful to have a clear understanding
of the dynamics of potential system disruption by assuming the confidence level remains
universal (Motter and Lai, 2002; Motter, 2004). In conclusion, our model captures how the
interplay of market confidence and price limits can generate a downward spiral during mar-
ket crash (see Methods). More broadly, the critical market confidence that maintains the
stability of the system is of primary interest in the presence of risk tolerance of individuals.
By unveiling the connection of the two, we obtain the gauging of market resilience in the
next section.
Price limits and critical market confidence: the undesirable relationship
The relevant parameters in the model design are the price limit c and market confidence
α. The prior interest is the minimum market confidence to guarantee the robustness of
the system, or say the critical α, given a fixed price limit. Denote it as αc. Here we use
dataset of Chinese mutual company’s holding positions to establish the bipartite network
and use numerical simulations on the real world network to illustrate and clarify the intuition
underpinning our model (see Methods).
To make the result independent on the initial shock, we apply a shock to the stocks one
at a time and iterate over the stocks set to obtain the averaged outcomes, see Fig. 2(a). The
initial shock could, in principle, cause crash of the entire system if α ≤ 1−c. The system can
6
switch between stable and unstable, which means that the stock market can either survive
and be healthy or completely collapse. More importantly, the phase transition boundary is
αc = 1− c, indicating that the critical market confidence does decrease with the deepening
of down price limit. In other words, the system tends to be more resilient to shocks when the
individual risk tolerance is higher. However, as the slope of their relationship is not steep
enough as expected, the critical market confidence could not be effectively curtailed with
respect to the increase of absolute value of downward price limit. Note that the downward
price limit is set as -10% in the Chinese stock market, where the critical market confidence
is still high according to our model. The micro-level market structure that leads to such
association has to be further examined, and it is also necessary to investigate the possibility
of proper structures in which the critical market confidence can be more efficiently reduced
by rising the absolute value of price limits, or the market resilience is to be enhanced.
(a)
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Figure 2: The relationship between critical market confidence and price limit down. (a) shows
the phase transition boundary as αc = 1 − c, from which the system switches from stable to unstable. (b)
shows the ratios of initially shocked stock whose neighbors’ maximum αci lie in the relative intervals with
respect to c ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. The darker the higher of the ratios. The grids on diagnose are the
darkest ones, indicating the majority of initial shocked stocks have at least one neighbor with αci = 1− c.
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Driving nodes: the critical ones that prompt system to collapse
As the market confidence α is felt by every investor holding the initially shocked stock
and then deliveries the ‘loss of market confidence’ depression to portfolios, it would be stocks
with the largest critical market confidence that determined the system-wide critical market
confidence, i.e., αc. For every initially shocked stock, denote αci as the market confidence
needed to avoid its neighboring stock i’s failure (neighboring stock i refers to a stock denoted
as i that shares at least one common investor with initially shocked stock), whose value at
τ could be accordingly derived (see Methods). Define ‘driving nodes’ as stocks that have
common investors with the initially shocked stocks and their αci are the largest among others
at τ = 1 for the initially shocked stocks. One would expect that these driving nodes play the
critical roles in regulating system resilience, i.e., the interconnection between the minimum
market confidence that needed to keep system stable and the pre-determined price limit.
From the empirical perspective, Fig. 2(b) illustrates the proportions of initial shocks on
behalf of their neighboring stocks’ maximum αci at τ = 1. The highest proportions lie on
the diagnose of the matrix, demonstrating that it is because the majority of initial shocked
stocks connected to at least one of the stocks with αci = 1 − c at τ = 1 that drives the
system phase transition boundary to be αc = 1− c that shown in Fig. 2(a).
Note that the driving nodes are arose from the micro-level network structure, one stock
is the driving node of another stock doesn’t mean it would be driving node for other stocks.
Denote the probability for the stocks to be driving nodes as PD, calculated as the ratio of the
stocks’ αci equal to 1− c at τ = 1 to all possible initial shocks. Fig. 3(a) exhibits that those
of high chances being driving nodes are indeed the ones that fail at the early stage. This
coincides with the argument that the success of passing the depression at the start-up phase
is the crucial component in cascading failures. Additionally, the inset in Fig. 3(a) indicates
that the probabilities of being driving nodes are low for most stocks while a few have high
probabilities of being driving nodes. In spite of this, the initial shocks would cascade and
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cause the stock network collapses provided that there is at least one driving node for any
initial attack. Therefore, the nodes with high likelihoods of being driving nodes are critical
in determining the system resilience at macroscopic scale.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: (a) The relationship between τ and PD. τ is the average cascading steps. PD is the probability
of being driving nodes. The Pearson correlation coefficient and p-value annotated in the plots are for the
main axes. The inset in (a) describes the distribution of PD. (b) The relationship between the time
to the peak moments for stocks reaching price limits and the maximum PD of failed stocks
in every minute. We consider four trading days when market crashes, including June 26, June 29, July
2 and July 3 in 2015, as they considerably speak for the 2015 Chinese market crash and these four days
are around the mutual fund ownership data’s disclosure date (Lu et al., 2018). We first divide each trading
day into a couple of non-overlapping time intervals where in each time interval there are stocks reaching
down price limits continuously in minute-granularity (see Fig. S1). These time intervals are called ‘waves’,
as they possibly incorporate cascading failure of stocks respectively. We also detect the peak minute(s) in
every wave where the number of failed stocks hits the local maximum, indicating a wide range of stocks’
failures is happening. The grey dotted line indicates where the peak moments are and the results before or
after the peaks are in different colors. The Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values annotated are for
the points separated by the grey dotted line.
On top of the cascading simulation in the bipartite network, the real-cases of market
crash also approve the idea that the driving nodes have far-reaching effects on depression
contagion. While the contagion model has considered only the case in which there is only
one stock failed at the beginning, the initial shock in real market collapse is hard to specify
and a more realistic scenario is one in which a network is subjected to simultaneous initial
shocks. In fact, when probing the number of newly failed stocks in a minute-granularity
manner during market crash, we always find appearance of local peaks (see Fig. S1). This
scenario can be modelled as a sequence of ‘waves’ of newly failed stocks that reaching price
limits (Tanizawa et al., 2005). And the probabilities of being driving nodes in the bipartite
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network, i.e., PD, is referred to as the stocks’ capability for driving other stocks reaching
price limits down in reality. Besides, the contagion model has implied that market collapse
would occur in the presence of at least one driving node. Thus we only use the maximum
PD among the failed stocks in each time slot, denoted as max(PD), to qualify the overall
driving ability of these failed stocks. Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 3(b), the closer to the
moment where a wide range of stocks failed, the bigger the max(PD) is. This suggests that
failures of stocks with high probabilities of being driving nodes in the established network
are indeed capable of leading the market destruction. On the one hand, the results coincide
with the simulation results in Fig. 3(a) to certain degree. On the other hand, the results
again empahsis the significant influence of these driving nodes to the stability of market,
making further examinations of their roles in structure necessary.
Structural roles: small nodes take over and pass on risk
In knowledge of the importance of driving nodes, how they emerge from the investing
activities is the major concern. From the theoretical perspective, the driving nodes, or say,
stocks with αci = 1 − c in the present real data case, originates from completely sharing
neighbors with initially shocked stocks (see Eq. (4) in Methods). And the probability of being
driving nodes are further determined by the exposure to connections with initially shocked
stocks. Thus we define nestedness as the ratio of overlapping investors and branching as
the degree of a stock relative to its largest investor’s degree (see Fig. 1 and Methods).
In general, the nestedness of one stock on a specific initially shocked stock measures how
likely it gets infected by the initial shock and reluctantly becomes driving node to pass on
depression contagion. The branching of a stock unfolds the balance between its variety in
terms of number of neighbors and the diversity of its largest neighbor’ investment portfolio.
Therefore, branching measures the potential of a stock for being driving node if other stocks
among its neighbors’ portfolios got shocked. Matching the driving nodes’ probability PD
with nestedness and branching, we find that the odds of being driving nodes are positively
10
correlated with the other two, see Fig. 4. On one hand, the stocks which have high nestedness
are doomed to have high probability of being driving nodes. On the other hand, the stocks
which are of high nestedness tend to possess high level of branching. The PD of stocks
that nestedness equal to 1, in particular, are strictly proportional to their branching. Note
that nestedness equal to 1 indicates that all of the stocks’ nearest neighboring stocks share
completely same neighbor(s) with them but have more neighbors than them. Thus the
perfect linearity in the inset of Fig. 4 reveals that the probability for these stocks to be
driving nodes depends on their branching, that is, how their investors diversified portfolios.
In particular, those of high probabilities of being driving nodes are connected to investors
holding a wide range of equities. By being so, the highly nested stocks are the most likely to
absorb the depression risk from their influential neighbors at the early stage and broadcast
shocks to other branches of the system.
Figure 4: The relationship between average nestedness and PD. PD is the probability of being
driving nodes. The definitions of nestedness and branching could be found in Methods. The correlations
annotated in the plots are for the main axes. The inset illustrates the relationship between PD and branching
for stocks with the average nestedness equal to 1.
Moreover, we find that those driving nodes are mainly small-cap stocks, with low degrees
but high branching and nestedness (see Fig. S2). The larger-cap stocks, on the contrary,
connect to more mutual fund companies, and thus have lower nestedness and branching
than the smaller-cap ones. The large gap in average degrees between the large-cap and
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small-cap stocks implies that while the large-cap stocks are popular among all the mutual
fund companies, the small-cap ones could only attract a few mutual fund companies. Ad-
ditionally, Fig. S3(a) shows that a large proportion of stocks are of small degrees whereas
a few stocks are held by almost everyone of the mutual fund companies. Unlike the stock
degree distribution, the mutual fund companies overall have high degrees, in particular a
few mutual fund companies hold nearly two thirds of the listed stocks. Therefore, aiming
at minimizing the investment risk, investors like the mutual fund companies who hold large
numbers of stocks tend to invest on the popular stocks (large-cap) and the unpopular ones
(small-cap). The popular ones become severely overlapped but the unpopular ones do not.
This leads to the small-cap stocks become the nodes of high nestedness and branching in
the network, making them relatively ‘small’ when compared with their neighboring stocks
but become the driving nodes that could turn over the system.
Different from previous studies in which the importance of ‘super-spreader’ in network
is emphasized (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Haldane and May, 2011), the present fact that
driving nodes could largely be recognized by nestedness and branching prompts the idea
of nodes with few neighbors but having one important neighbor would play essential part
in our story. In other words, the connections to investors that having exposures across a
wider set of stocks make the small stocks possess higher risk on taking-over the depression.
Stocks that are nested too much on others should be protected first for the sake of the whole
system. And the reason behind this is the homogenous investment strategy that seek for
not only wide diversity but also preference on some particular stocks for their safety (see
Fig. S4).
Many different mechanisms have been suggested in the literature to account for such
a high degree of similarity across portfolios including connections between mutual fund
managers and corporate board members, herding behavior and imitation of successful diver-
sification strategies (Cohen-Cole et al., 2014; Corsi et al., 2016). Another potential reason
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behinds the similarity of investing pattern is the investing concentration on a range of stocks
with high social trust in Chinese stock market as it is believed that stocks with high social
trust have smaller crash risks (Li et al., 2017). These prudential investment strategies are
designed to enhance the market resilience for shocks. However, they lead to a more densely
connected heterogeneous financial market and the emergence of small but critical stocks
that take over initial shocks and drive further depression, thus undermine system resilience.
Risk contagion: cascading patterns due to driving nodes
Considering the particularity of driving nodes in the microstructure and their critical
roles in the acceptance and diffusion of depression, they may lead to a formation of stable
macroscopic cascading patterns. Understanding such patterns not only helps to recognize
the systemic impact of driving nodes, but also offers references for precautionary actions of
collapse prevention and even brings about the power of prediction. Given the fact that the
stocks of high probabilities of being driving nodes are those of high nestedness, a reasonable
path for risk contagion would be from the network periphery to the core and then spread
to the entire system. Here we use k-core index as the description of the nodes’ locations
in network for its effectiveness in detecting cores and peripheries (Kitsak et al., 2010). The
left panel in Fig. 5 clearly demonstrates that the initial attack towards the system first hit
the periphery, where the driving nodes locate, and then spreads to the inside. By then, a
wide range of failures emerges, propagates to the whole network and results in the system
collapse. Note that the contagion dynamics are not long-lived, as the simulation always
terminates within a few steps, due to the fact that our network is a rather small one (see
Fig. S5 and Fig. S6 for how the cascading proceeds).
We also probe the k-core index distribution using the real-world stocks’ failing procedure
and find great similarity, see right panel of Fig. 5. A similar trend of the contagion procedure
is found in these four market crashing days, separating by the lunch breaks. To be specific,
the order of stocks reaching their limit down prices in the real world is similar: from outside
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to inside, then from inside to outside (see also for Fig. S7). This validates that our model
approximation gives agreement similar to that seen in real market crash.
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Figure 5: The k-core index of stocks reaching the limit down prices. The left panel presents the
averaged k-core index at each τ in the simulation course from the proposed contagion model. The boxes
show the distribution of the averaged k-core index at τ . The smooth line (orange) shows the trend of the
mean of the averaged k-core index at each τ . The right panel which contains four subplots shows the k-core
indexes of stocks reaching the limit down prices in four market crashing days. The smooth lines (red) depict
the trend of the mean of the stocks’ k-core indexes. The grey dotted lines imply the lunch breaks. For the
purpose of clearly visualizing data, outliers have been dropped.
More importantly, one insight in addition to a previous study, that the root case of
the system collapse is the extinction of nodes located in the maximum k-core of the net-
work (Morone et al., 2019), has emerged. We argue that the driving nodes on the periphery
are essential, as they firstly pass on the failures to the core nodes inside the network, that
lead the system reach global failure eventually.
Admittedly, the results could only provide slim prediction power of stocks failures due to
the fact that the network is built on the mutual funds investors while the individual investors
are the majority traders in Chinese stock markets. However, the network is still of valuable
representation for the whole market considering that individual investors are easily allured
by mutual fund institutions’ holding positions and investment trending and that mutual
funds occupy a large fraction of overall trading value in mature markets like US, Japan and
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Hongkong (Lu et al., 2018). More importantly, the success on approximating the real-world
stocks’ failing process at the macro-level endows the contagion model with an early warning
capability. And the results also suggest that the small stocks, which play the roles of driving
nodes on the network periphery, should be protected or isolated for precautionary purposes.
Overall, the contagion model would be good a resemblance to the actual market crash.
Discussion
Though the single-security price limit is widely used in stock markets of different counties,
the exact knowledge of its influence on market resilience is still unknown. In the proposed
bipartite network based on common asset exposure in stock market, we specifically study the
relationship between the critical market confidence αc that could maintain system stability
and single-security limit down c in a risk contagion model design. The linear relationship
between the two, which signals the verge of the financial system becoming unstable, implies
that αc cannot be reduced significantly when rising the absolute value of c. The fine-tuned
price limit, in essence, cannot drastically alter the critical market confidence as expected.
From this perspective, the slope of αc and c would be a new indicator to reflect the system
resilience. The results are similar if we use mutual funds as the investors in the network
instead of mutual fund companies with respect to network structure and the embedded
relationship between critical parameters (see Fig. S8 and Fig. S9). This sheds lights on
the counterproductive of the accordant single price limit setting in the circumstance of
investment behavior pattern like China.
Essentially, the verge of the system stability is awarded by the overall similarity among
investments. Even though fund managers are professional investors whose diversification
strategies cannot be reduced to random selection of assets, several studies have mentioned
that the investing behavior among mutual funds is similar (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Lu
et al., 2018; Delpini et al., 2019). The herding behavior is more severe in Chinese stock
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market where we find that similar heterogeneity characterizes the stocks: most stocks are
found in the portfolios of a few funds, but some stocks enjoy huge popularity and are held by
almost every fund. Stocks with investments from few mutual fund companies are mostly held
by those who tend to over-diversify their portfolios. Therefore, they enjoy high nestedness
and branching, indicating that they are relatively small in terms of number of investors but
have severe portfolio overlapping with other stocks and are able to link the initially shocked
stock with other stocks through these investors. On the one hand, they can quickly fail in
reaction to the losses of the initially shocked stock’s illiquidity even with considerable level of
price limit. On the other hand, they increase the chances that other stocks will be exposed
to investors who experiencing panic selling in the first round of depression contagion, acting
like driving nodes for further system collapse. That is to say, when the failure of such a
stock triggers contagious illiquidity because of price limit, a large number of its investors’
linkages also increases the potential for contagion to be extremely widespread. In conclusion,
the small stocks are vulnerable to the first-round of failure and are critical to the further
round price limits implements and illiquidity propagation. Additionally, knowing that these
small stocks are usually blind spots for regulators, our results highlight their critical roles
in determining the system resilience in reaction to individual risk tolerance. And it is the
herding behavior on diversification strategies that leads to the dominance of small but critical
stocks in the system.
One of the possible ways to augment system resilience is to adjust the investing pattern
on the whole to avoid the dominance of small but critical stocks. To achieve this, we conduct
a series of straightforward random experiments, see Fig. 6. When we completely randomize
the original network, the linearity between αc and c has become steeper, i.e., αc = 1 − 2c,
which is good as the critical market confidence is lower at a certain level of price limit as
compared to the original case. In fact, even with randomizing of a part of the original
network, the linearity of αc = 1 − c would be successfully adjusted. This implies that the
16
system resilience could be improved by regulating the whole picture of investment pattern
whereas retaining part of the original investment structure. In essence, the randomizations
have successfully modify the distribution of both nestedness and branching (see Fig. S10).
The nodes with high nestedness are gradually eliminated with the increase of randomization,
indicating the extent of portfolio overlapping has been reduced. As a result, it would be
more difficult for the driving nodes to take over failures and the system resilience would then
be promoted. Similarly, the number of nodes with high branching have been significantly
curtailed, implying the risk broadcasting power and the exposure to risk of driving nodes will
be lowered accordingly. The adaption of the exact relationship between αc and c through
randomizing the network in Fig. 6, in turn, highlights the importance of nestedness and
branching in terms of system resilience. The exploratory experiments show that imposing
the variated investment strategy on the whole or partly can thus enhance the resilience of the
system. More broadly, if market participants could make a compromise between individual
profit maximization and system stability enhancement, weakening the herding behavior and
rethinking the over-diversified investment strategy simultaneously, the market structure will
be reformed as the nestedness and branching are redistributed. As a result, the system
resilience would be boosted and the price limit will work better for stabilizing the market.
The unexpected side effect of the principle of profit maximization and risk minimization
in the individual level of investors is inherently missed in existing understandings of port-
folios. While our results both theoretically and empirically suggest that from the view of
system resilience, overlapping portfolios due to herding investments derived from this prin-
ciple unintentionally forge the emergence of small yet critical stocks that drive the market
to collapse. In terms of networking investors and stocks, ideas from system science can help
manifest the market crash and inject new insights to the practice of market supervision.
And to obtain these insights might be challenging for the classical approaches in finance.
Even more importantly, the crash of stock market also offers a new testbed to examine the
17
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
c
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
α c
αc=1− c
αc=1−2c
p=0
p=0.2
p=0.3
p=0.5
p=1
Figure 6: The relationship between αc and c when randomizing the stock-investor network. p
denotes the proportion of which the edges in the original network are randomized. The results for different p
are shown in different colors and marker shapes, along with lines of best fit (results with αc ≈ 0 are neglected
in the lines of best fit). For each p, we delete a proportion of p edges in the original network and generate
the same amount of edges apart from the 1− p edges that have been kept in the network. Thus, p indicates
the extent of randomization. When p = 1, for example, random bipartite networks that possess the same
amounts of nodes and edges with the real network are generated. On the contrary, when p = 0, there is no
randomization and the original network is completely kept, which will give us the results in Fig. 2(a). All
the edge weights are set to be equal in the randomization experiments for simplicity. The initial attacked
stocks are also randomly selected to initiate the contagion procedures and the procedures are repeated 600
times for each p. Note that the slope of the linearity between αc and c is -2 in the most random design. The
reasons are that, first, under the circumstance of a dense network, the market value of the failed stock is
extremely small compared to the market value of all stocks one investors hold, so
∑
f∈Fτ wf,m,τ=0
Am,τ
in Eq. (3)
is still small (recall that it is the τ = 0 that matters). Second, the scheme of randomly linking investor
nodes and stock nodes makes the probabilities same for investors holding the failed stocks or not holding
the failed stocks, i.e.,
∑
m∈Lτ αwi,m,τ∑
m wi,m,τ=0
=
∑
m/∈Lτ wi,m,τ∑
m wi,m,τ=0
= 0.5 in Eq. (5), which gives αc = 1− 2c.
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previous understandings of system science and surprisingly, small nodes, which are conven-
tionally thought to be trivial in risk contagion, emerge to be the most critical parts that
reignite the failure cascading and determine the system behavior at the critical phase. By
lowering the disassortativeness of the system, the entanglement between small but critical
parts and instability of the whole system can be effectively weakened, thus leading to en-
hancement of system resilience. Our results may be of interest to policy markers tasked
with developing regulation to promote market-wide stability and venue operators interested
in designing effective trading strategies.
Methods
Data
The dataset contains the market value of shares held by mutual fund for listed stocks
on June 30 2015, around the period that the severe stock market crash happened. It covers
1512 mutual funds and 2709 stocks listed on either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen
Stock Exchange. Lu et al. (2018) has pointed out that though the ownership data is taken
at one particular time of the year, it represents noisy yet unbiased estimate of mutual funds
investment preferences in that year or at least the days around the reporting date. We group
ownership by mutual fund management companies as we assume that mutual funds under
the same management company could have collective actions on an individual stock. The
edge weights are equal to the sum of market value hold by mutual funds under the same
management institutes. There are 87 mutual fund companies and 2709 stocks included in
the study. Additionally, we deploy the proposed model into the mutual fund and stock
network, in which the 1512 mutual funds are used as in the investor entities in Fig. 1 instead
of the 87 mutual fund companies. The network is less denser and the results could be found
in Fig. S8 and Fig. S9, which are consistent with those from the network of mutual fund
companies and stocks.
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The timing of stocks reaching their limit down prices are obtained by integrating two
sources of information: the statuses of stocks and the stocks’ intraday prices. The statuses
of stocks acknowledge us whether the stocks reach their limit down prices or not during the
trading day. If they did, we pick out the time that the stocks first reached their lowest prices
of the day, i.e., their limit down prices, as their moments of failures. Data are downloaded
from Wind Information.
Contagion model
We develop the following contagion model with market confidence α ∈ [0, 1] and price
limit c ∈ (0, 1).
Step 1: τ = 0, we initially shock a single stock i, wiping out c of its market value and it
is then considered as failed. We have Sm,τ=1 = (1− c)Sm,τ=0, wi,m,τ=1 = (1− c)wi,m,τ=0.
Step 2: Updata the stocks’ market value ∀i, Si,τ =
∑
mwi,m,τ .
Step 3: If ∀i, Si,τ−Si,τ=0
Si,τ=0
> −c, no further failures, the algorithm ends. If ∃i, Si,τ−Si,τ=0
Si,τ=0
≤
−c, we call these stocks failed and add them into the stocks list Fτ . The set of neighbors of
stocks belong to Fτ is denoted as Lτ .
Step 4: Delete the stocks in Fτ as they reach their down limit prices and are regarded
as completely illiquid. Update the investors holding market value, Am,τ =
∑
iwi,m,τ .
Step 5: τ = τ + 1, update the investors holding values, i.e., ∀m ∈ Lτ , ∀i , wi,m,τ+1 =
αAm,τ+1
Am,τ
. The term Am,τ+1
Am,τ
defines the degree of illiquidity results from the price limits of
failed stocks in which we assume that the illiquidity of holding portfolio, a depreciating
investor may depress the price of those stocks in the market. The confidence effects on stock
prices depression are mild or negligible when α = 1, but become more severe as α decrease.
Step 6: Return to Step 2.
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Theoretical explanation: the nestedness and branching
By mapping our model onto a generalized process, we show analytically here that there
is a region in parameter space where further cascades of failures occur. Denote the market
value of investor m holding stock i as wi,m,τ , i.e., the edge weight from node m to node i.
The original market value of stock i is Si,τ=0 =
∑
mwi,m,τ=0. The original market value of
investor is Am,τ=0 =
∑
iwi,m,τ=0. Denote the stocks fail at τ as Fτ . Denote the investors
holding stocks that fail at τ as Lτ . Considering the devaluation in Eq.(2), the stocks’ failure
boundary in Eq.(1) could be written as
∑
m∈Lτ α(1−
∑
f∈Fτ wf,m,τ=0
Am,τ
)wi,m,τ +
∑
m/∈Lτ wi,m,τ∑
mwi,m,τ=0
≤ 1− c, (3)
where m belongs to the investors stock i connects. Following Eq.(1) and (2), for every
initially shocked stock, the market confidence needed to avoid its neighboring stock i’s
failure at τ + 1 could be calculated as
αci =
(1− c)∑mwi,m,τ=0 −∑m/∈Lτ wi,m,τ=0∑
m∈Lτ (1−
∑
i∈Fτ wi,m,τ=0
Am,τ
)wi,m,τ=0
. (4)
Consider τ = 0, we assume that
∑
f∈Fτ wf,m,τ=0
Am,τ
is rather small because the investors have
a wide range of portfolios and one of them would not be comparable with the investors’
total holding values. See Fig. S3(d) for evidence in the Chinese case. Eq.(3) would then be
simplified as ∑
m∈Lτ αwi,m,τ +
∑
m/∈Lτ wi,m,τ∑
mwi,m,τ=0
≤ 1− c. (5)
The intuition behind the numerator is that the market value of stock i consists of two parts:
one part held by investors connect to the failed stocks, the other part held by investors do
not connect to the failed stocks. Apparently, the ratios of the two are critical in the network
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cascading. Inspired by this, two indicators for stocks are raised: nestedness and branching.
The nestedness of stock i on stock j is the degree of how stock i would be influenced by
stock j’s failure, which could be defined as
nestedness of stock i on stock j =
the number of common neighbors between i and j
the degree of i
.
(6)
Nestedness basically measures the severity of portfolio overlapping. Note that the nestedness
of stock i on stock j is not equal to the nestedness of stock j on stock i. For instance,
suppose stock i is held by few investors while these investors hold the other stock j, then
the nestedness of stock i on stock j would be one (see Fig. 1(c)). But if the stock j has
more investors, the nestedness of stock j on stock i would be small. A higher value of
nestedness implies a higher value of
∑
m∈Lτ wi,m,τ∑
m wi,m,τ=0
in Eq.(5) if edge weights are really close
to each other, which means the stocks with higher nestedness have greater potential to get
infected by other stocks’ failures and their failures will drive further rounds of risk contagion
(see Fig. 4).
The branching for stock i is defined as
branching =
the highest degree of i’s neighbors
the degree of i
. (7)
Branching takes account of the number of neighbors stock i have by definition and thus
reveals the probability of stock i’s exposure to other stocks’ failures. Remember in each step
of contagion, it is only the stocks which share common neighbors with failed stocks that are
taken account into the devaluation and have the potential to reach price limits, i.e., Eq.(3).
Therefore, branching unfolds the overall extent of stock i’s exposure to random shocks.
Additionally, branching also depicts the capacity of spreading risk because it correlates to the
number of stocks that one failed stocks could pass the depression to others through common
22
neighbors (see Fig. 1(d)). A high level of branching is basically an outcome of investors’
highly diversified portfolios. Nestedness and branching altogether govern the potential for
the spread of shocks through the network and it is shown that they help provide effective
information into the causes of the potential dynamical behavior as well as influence system
resilience.
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Figure S1: The waves of stocks reaching limit down prices during market crash. The x-axis
denotes the trading hours in minute-granularity from 9:30am to 11:30am and 13:00pm to 15:00pm. The
y-axis is the number of stocks that reach their limit down prices, i.e., stocks that failed. The lunch breaks
that range from 11:30am to 13:00pm everyday are neglected. Four trading days are regarded as market
crashing days. A wave is defined as a time interval in which at least one stock reached limit down prices
substantially in minute-granularity. The red bars denote the moments when the number of failed stocks
reach the peak in a wave.
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Figure S2: The characteristic of different stocks. The stocks are classified into nine groups according
to market value and book-to-earning ratio. The classification is provided by Wind Information. The x-axis
ticks of the five indicators are omitted for clarity purpose.
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Figure S3: The attributes of mutual fund companies and stocks network. (a) Degree distribution
of stocks. (b) Degree distribution of mutual fund companies. (c) Weight distribution. (d) The weight ratios.
wi,m is the market value of mutual fund company m invests on stock i. Am is the stocks’ market value that
company m holds.
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(a) (b)
Figure S4: Degree disassortative. 〈knn〉(k) denotes the average nearest neighbor degree of nodes with
degree k. (a) X-axis is the degrees of stocks. The smaller the degrees of the stocks, the larger degrees of
companies invest on them. (b) X-axis is the degrees of companies. The smaller the degrees of the companies,
the larger degrees of stocks they would invest on. Overall, these two plots show that those who invest on the
stocks with lower degrees have over-diversified portfolio strategies, and those who have mid-level diversified
strategy would prefer the popular stocks (with high degrees). In addition, the companies holding stocks
that enjoy popularity (with high degrees), though possess lower degrees on average, are still with degrees
higher than 600, revealing the great potential for risk contagion.
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Figure S5: The system status for each step τ when c = 0.1. (a) The total stock market value left in
the network in process of cascading failure. (b) The ratio of newly failed stocks in the corresponding time
step. A high α can slow down the collapse of the system.
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Figure S6: The distribution of active stocks’ percentage changes at each time step τ . Stocks
failed before τ step have been excluded in the network and the percentage changes of all the active stocks
left are thus calculated. The stocks of percentage changes smaller than −c will be the newly failed stocks
at τ . As can be seen, most failures happen before the final step.
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Figure S7: Four snapshots on the cascading of stocks reaching the limit down prices on June
29, 2015 in Chinese stock market. (a) Time interval is 9:25am 9:30am. (b) Time interval is 10:00am-
10:30am. (c) Time interval is 13:30pm-13:30pm. (d) Time interval is 14:30pm-15:00pm. Failing stocks (red)
are those reach down limit prices in the corresponding time interval. Failed stocks (grey) are those have
already reached down limit prices before the starting point of the corresponding time interval. Active stocks
(green) are those that have not reached down limit prices. The numbers in the graphs denote the k-core
indexes. That is to say, the closer the nodes are to the core, the higher their k-core indexes are. It can be
seen that the failures begin at the periphery, then move to the core, spread to the whole system and finally
come back to periphery again.
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Figure S8: Mutual fund and stock network attributes. (a) Degree distribution of stocks. (b) Degree
distributions of mutual funds. (c) Weight distribution. (d) The weight ratios. wi,m is the market value of
mutual fund m invests on stock i. Am is the stocks’ market value that fund m holds.
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Figure S9: The αc in the mutual fund and stocks network and the corresponding average step.
(a) The relationship between αc and c. The linearity is the same with Fig. 2(a) in the main text. (b) The
average step when αc = 1 − c using the mutual fund as investors instead of mutual fund companies. It is
obvious that average step are higher as the mutual fund and stocks network is less denser than the network
of mutual fund companies and stocks so it would take longer for the contagion to stop.
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Figure S10: The distribution of nestedness and branching when randomizing a proportion of p
edges on the original network. The p denotes the proportion of which the edges in the original network
are randomized, which is the same with Fig. 6 in the main text. Each of the histogram is based on one
round of randomization experiment for every p. For visualization purpose, the histograms do not share the
same y-axis. It can be seen that distributions of both the nestedness and branching have been changed when
partially or fully randomizing the original network.
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